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Abstract
Market equilibrium is a solution concept with many applications such as digital ad
markets, fair division, and resource sharing. For many classes of utility functions,
equilibria are captured by convex programs. We develop simple first-order methods
that are suitable for solving these programs for large-scale markets. We focus on
three practically-relevant utility classes: linear, quasilinear, and Leontief utilities.
Using structural properties of a market equilibrium under each utility class, we
show that the corresponding convex programs can be reformulated as optimization
of a structured smooth convex function over a polyhedral set, for which projected
gradient achieves linear convergence. To do so, we utilize recent linear convergence
results under weakened strong-convexity conditions, and further refine the relevant
constants, both in general and for our specific setups. We then show that proxi-
mal gradient (a generalization of projected gradient) with a practical version of
linesearch achieves linear convergence under the Proximal-PŁ condition. For quasi-
linear utilities, we show that Mirror Descent applied to a specific convex program
achieves sublinear last-iterate convergence and recovers the Proportional Response
dynamics, an elegant and efficient algorithm for computing market equilibrium
under linear utilities. Numerical experiments show that proportional response is
highly efficient for computing an approximate solution, while projected gradient
with linesearch can be much faster when higher accuracy is required.
1 Introduction
Market equilibrium is a classical model from economics, where the decision of who gets what
and why is based on finding a set of market-clearing prices such that every market participant
gets allocated an optimal bundle given the prices and their budgets. In this paper we study the
Fisher market model, where a set of n buyers compete for m items. In the case where items are
divisible, Fisher market equilibrium has several applications. In the competitive equilibrium from
equal incomes (CEEI) mechanism for fair division, a set of m items are fairly divided among n agents
(e.g., spliddit.org). The mechanism works by giving every agent a budget of one unit of fake
money. Then, a market equilibrium is computed, and the allocation from the equilibrium is used as
the fair division of the items (the prices are discarded since they are for fake money) [61]. CEEI has
recently been suggested for fair recommender systems [40, 41]. Divisible Fisher market equilibrium
has also been shown equivalent to the pacing equilibrium solution concept for budget smoothing
in Internet ad auctions [24, 23]. When items are indivisible, (approximate) CEEI has been used for
allocating courses to students [13, 14], and the related max Nash welfare solution for fairly dividing
estates and other goods [16]. The indivisible setting can be related to the divisible setting via lotteries,
though the question of when lotteries can be resolved satisfactorily is intricate [15, 1].
Market equilibrium In this paper we focus on computing Fisher market equilibrium in the divisible
setting. Let the market consists of n buyers and m goods. Buyer i has budget Bi > 0 and utility
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function ui : Rm+ → R+. As mentioned above, Bi = 1 for all i corresponds to the CEEI mechanism.
Without loss of generality, assume each good j has unit supply. An (aggregate) allocation is a matrix
x = [x>1 ; . . . ;x
>
n ] ∈ Rn×m+ , where xij is the amount of item j purchased by buyer i. Given prices
p ∈ Rm+ for the goods, the demand of buyer i is defined as the set of utility-maximizing allocations:
Di(p) = arg max
{
ui(xi) | xi ∈ Rn+, 〈p, xi〉 ≤ Bi
}
.
A competitive equilibrium is a pair of prices and allocations (p, x), p ∈ Rm+ that satisfy the following
conditions [30, 37]:
• Buyer optimality: xi ∈ Di(p) for all i ∈ [n],
• Market clearance: ∑ni=1 xij ≤ 1 for all j ∈ [m], and equality must hold if pj > 0.
We say that ui is homogeneous (with degree 1) if it satisfies ui(αxi) = αui(xi) for any xi ≥ 0
and α > 0 [50, §6.2]. We assume that ui are concave, continuous, nonnegative, and homogeneous
utilities (CCNH). This captures many widely used utilities, such as linear, Leontief, Cobb-Douglas,
and general Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utilities (see, e.g., [51, §6.1.5] and [9]). For
CCNH utilities, a market equilibrium can be computed using the following Eisenberg-Gale convex
program (EG):
max
n∑
i=1
Bi log ui(xi) s.t.
n∑
i=1
xij ≤ 1, x ≥ 0. (1)
More precisely, we state the following theorem, which is well-known in various forms in the literature:
see, e.g., [50, §6.2] for the case of differentiable ui and Eisenberg’s original work [29, Theorem 4]
for the convex program with objective being the Nash social welfare (exponentiation of that of (1)).
For completeness, we present an elementary, self-contained proof in Appendix A.1. Note that the
assumption essentially means that everyone can at least get positive utility.
Theorem 1 Let ui be concave, continuous, nonnegative, and homogeneous (CCNH). Assume that
there exists x ≥ 0 such that∑i xij ≤ 1 for all j and ui(xi) > 0. Then, any optimal solution x∗ to
(1) together with its optimal Lagrangian multipliers p∗ ∈ Rm+ constitute a market equilibrium, up to
arbitrary assignment of zero-price items. Furthermore, 〈p∗, xi〉 = Bi for all i.
We focus on linear, quasilinear (QL) and Leontief utilities. Under linear utilities, the utility of buyer
i is ui(xi) = 〈vi, xi〉. As mentioned above, linear utilities are used in the CEEI mechanism in fair
division and fair recommender systems. QL utilities have the form ui(xi) =
∑
j(vij − pj)xij , which
depends on the prices [18, 21]. It captures budget-smoothing problems in first- and second-price
auction markets [24, 23]. Leontief utilities have the form ui(xi) = minj∈Ji
xij
aij
(see §5). This models
perfectly complementary goods and is suitable in resource sharing scenarios where the utility of an
agent is capped by its dominant resource, such as allocating different types of compute resources to
computing tasks [33, 39].
Another notable convex program that captures market equilibrium under linear utilities is Shmyrev’s
[58] (see Appendix B.1 and (19) there for more details). [8] shows that the well-known Proportional
Response dynamics (PR) [67] for computing market equilibrium is in fact Mirror Descent applied
to Shmyrev’s convex program (19). We will show that both Shmyrev’s convex program and PR
generalize elegantly to QL utilities.
In principle, (1) can be solved using an interior-point method (IPM) that handles exponential cones
[59, 25]. However, it does not scale to large markets since IPM requires solving a very large linear
system per iteration. This linear system can often be ill-conditioned and relatively dense, even when
the problem itself is sparse. This makes IPM impractical for applications such as fair recommender
systems and ad markets, where the numbers of buyers and items are typically extremely large. In
this paper, we investigate iterative first-order methods (FOMs) for computing equilibria of Fisher
markets. Because each FOM iteration has low cost, which usually scales only with the number
of nonzeros when the problem is sparse, these methods are suitable for scaling up to very large
markets. Furthermore, there have been variants of FOMs that allow parallel and distributed updates,
making them even more scalable [17, 57, 66, 44]. This is analogous to other equilibrium-computation
settings such as zero-sum Nash equilibrium, where iterative first-order methods are also the state-
of-the-art [10, 47, 42]. We will focus on the important classes of linear, quasi-linear and Leontief
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utilities, which are discussed in §3, 4 and 5, respectively. We also note that under CES utilities, PR
yields linearly convergent prices and utilities [67, Theorem 4]. Meanwhile, market equilibrium under
Cobb-Douglas utilities can be computed explicitly. See Appendix A.6 for more details.
First-order methods Consider optimization problems of the form
f∗ = min
x∈X
f(x) = h(Ax) + 〈q, x〉, (2)
where X is a bounded polyhedral set, h : Rr → R is (µ,L)-s.c., A ∈ Rd×r and q ∈ Rd. We say
that an algorithm for (2) converges linearly (in objective value) with rate ρ ∈ (0, 1) if its iterates xt
satisfy f(xt)− f∗ ≤ ρt(f(x0)− f∗), t = 1, 2, . . . , where x0 ∈ dom f is an initial iterate and f∗ is
the (unique) minimum objective. Unless otherwise stated, X ∗ denotes the set of optimal solutions to
(2). It is always a bounded polyhedral set [64, Lemma 14].
Various FOMs, such as the following, are naturally suitable for (2).
• Projected gradient (PG): xt+1 = ΠX (xt − γt∇f(x)), where γt is the stepsize.
• Frank-Wolfe (FW): xt+1 = xt + γt(wt − xt), where wt ∈ arg minw∈X 〈∇f(xt), w〉
[32, 12, 4, 43]. Unless otherwise stated, wt is chosen from the set of vertices of X .
• Mirror Descent: xt+1 = arg minx∈X 〈∇f(xt), x− xt〉+ γD(x‖xt) [49, 5]. Here, D is the
Bregman divergence of a differentiable convex function d (see, e.g., [7, §5.3]).
It is well-known that, for a broad class of convex optimization problems, these FOMs and their
variants achieve sublinear convergence, that is, f(x˜t)− f∗ = O (t−k) for some k > 0, where x˜t is
either xt or a weighted average of xτ , τ ≤ t [12, 7, 3]. When f is strongly convex, linear convergence
can be derived. However, strong convexity is highly restrictive and relaxed conditions sufficient for
linear convergence have been proposed. For example, the classical Polyak-Łojasiewicz (PŁ) condition
ensures linear convergence of gradient descent [55, 45]. Also have long been studied are various
error bound (EB) conditions, which, roughly speaking, say that the distance from a feasible solution
x (possibly required to be close to X ∗) to X ∗ is bounded by a constant multiple of a computable
“residual” of x [46, 60, 64]. Another notable example is the quadratic growth (QG) condition, which
essentially means that the objective grows at least quadratically in the distance to X ∗ [56, 2, 27].
Furthermore, it can be seen to be equivalent to an EB under further assumptions on the problem [27].
Recently, [38] shows that a so-called Proximal-PŁ condition, a generalization of the PŁ condition,
is sufficient for linear convergence of proximal gradient, and is also equivalent to a few existing
conditions for the canonical “f + g” composite form.
Summary of contributions We show that PG, FW and MD are suitable for computing market
equilibrium via convex optimization formulations. Through various reformulations exploiting convex
optimization duality and properties of various market equilibria, they can be reformulated into convex
programs with structured objectives over simple polyhedral sets. We then derive linear convergence
of PG through establishing the Proximal-PŁ condition. As a technical contribution, we prove that
proximal gradient with a practical linesearch subroutine converges linearly, with a bounded number
of backtracking steps per iteration, for problems satisfying the Proximal-PŁ condition. For linear
utilities, we show that PG applied to EG (1) achieves linear convergence and also yields a sequence
of prices converging linearly to the unique equilibrium prices. For QL utilities, we show that PG
applied to the corresponding convex program (4) also achieves linear convergence and yields bids
and prices that converge linearly to their respective equilibrium quantities. Furthermore, we show that
Mirror Descent for its corresponding convex program (4) achieves sublinear last-iterate convergence
with a small constant. It also leads to a form of Proportional Response dynamics (PR), a distributed
algorithm for computing market equilibrium, extending the results under the linear case [8, 67].
For Leontief utilities, we show that PG for a reformulated dual of (1) achieves linear convergence.
Extensive numerical experiments show that PR and FW can quickly obtaining approximate solutions,
while PG with linesearch is more efficient when higher accuracy is desired.
Notation Denote the j-th unit vector and vector of 1’s in Rd as ej,(d) and 1(d), respectively, where
the superscript (d) is omitted when d is clear form the context. The d-dimensional simplex is
∆d = {x ∈ Rd : 1>x = 1, x ≥ 0}. For any vector x, x+ denotes the vector with entries max{xi, 0}
and nnz(x) denote its number of nonzeros. All unsubscripted vector norms and matrix norms are
Euclidean 2-norms and matrix 2-norms (largest singular value), respectively. Say a function is
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(µ,L)-strongly convex, or (µ,L)-s.c. for short, if it is µ-strongly convex and smooth on its domain
with a L-Lipschitz continuous (w.r.t. ‖ · ‖ = ‖ · ‖2) gradient. For a closed convex set X ⊆ Rd,
int(X ) denotes the interior of X , ΠX (x) denotes the Euclidean projection of x ∈ Rd onto X and
Diam(X ) = supx,y∈X ‖x− y‖. For p, q ∈ Rd+, the (generalized) Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence
of p w.r.t. q isD(p‖q) = ∑i pi log piqi −∑i pi+∑i qi. Denote the maximum and minimum nonzero
singular values of A as σmax(A) and σmin(A), respectively.
2 Linear convergence of gradient-based methods
For PG, it has been shown that linear convergence can be achieved for non-strongly convex objectives
under various relaxed conditions [46, 27, 38]. In particular, (2) can be shown to satisfy several such
conditions and therefore guarantees linear convergence under PG. One notion of central significance
in many such results is the Hoffman constant. For A ∈ Rd×r and polyhedral set X ⊆ Rd, denote the
(relative) Hoffman constant of A w.r.t. X as HX (A), which is the smallest H > 0 such that, for any
z ∈ range(A), S = {x : Ax = z}, it holds that ‖x−ΠX∩S(x)‖ ≤ H‖Ax− z‖ for all x ∈ X (the
Hoffman inequality). Note that HX (A) is always well-defined, finite, and depends only on A and
X [35, 53]. In the optimization context, the intuition is as follows: the set of optimal solutions X ∗
can often be expressed as X ∗ = X ∩ S, which means the distance to optimality can be bounded by
a constant multiple of the residual ‖Ax− z‖. Therefore, the Hoffman inequality can be viewed as
an EB condition. Further details on this definition, as well as its connection to the classical explicit
expression, can be found in Appendix A.2. Using the Hoffman inequality, we have the following
linear convergence guarantee. It is a special case of [38, Theorem 5]. A proof is in Appendix A.3,
which is essentially the same as [38, Appendix F]. However, our proof is slightly refined to allow a
weakened condition, provide more details on the relevant constants and conclude iterate convergence.
Theorem 2 For (2) with q = 0, PG with a constant stepsize γt = 1L‖A‖2 generates x
t such that
µ
2HX (A)
‖xt −ΠX∗(xt)‖2 ≤ f(xt)− f∗ ≤
(
1− µmax{µ,LHX (A)2‖A‖2}
)t (
f(x0)− f∗) for all t.
For the case of q 6= 0, we have the following instead, which relies heavily on the boundedness of X .
The proof is in Appendix A.4. The key is to establish a QG condition similar to the one in [4, Lemma
2.3], with slightly improved constants. We note that linear convergence with a slightly different rate
can also be deduced through an error bound condition, which also holds for (2) (see, e.g., [64, 27]).
Theorem 3 There exists unique z∗ ∈ Rr and t∗ ∈ R such that Ax∗ = z∗ and 〈q, x∗〉 = t∗ for
any x∗ ∈ X ∗. Furthermore, PG for (2) with constant stepsize γt = 1L‖A‖2 , starting from x0 ∈ X ,
generates xt such that 1κ‖xt −ΠX∗(xt)‖ ≤ f(xt)− f∗ ≤ Cρt, where
ρ = 1− 1max{1,2κL‖A‖2} , κ = HX (A)2
(
C + 2GDA +
2(G2+1)
µ
)
,C = f(x0)−f∗,G = ‖∇h(z∗)‖,
DA = supx,x′∈X ‖A(x− x′)‖.
For FW, the classical sublinear convergence holds. Specifically, for (2), using FW with static
stepsizes or exact linesearch, that is, γt = 22+t or γt ∈ arg minγ∈[0,1] f(xt + γ(wt − xt)), it holds
that f(xt)− f∗ ≤ Diam(X )2L‖A‖2k+2 for all t (see, e.g., [36, Theorem 1] and [20, Theorem 2.3]). The
advantage of FW is that it leads to highly sparse iterates when X has sparse vertices. The reason
is that, if we start with x0 being a vertex, then xt is a convex combination of (t+ 1) vertices. For
subsequent market equilibrium convex programs, the constraint set X of (1) is a product of simplexes
∆m. Therefore, any vertex of X has the form x ∈ {0, 1}n×m, where for each j ∈ [m], there is
exactly one ij ∈ [n] such that xijj = 1. Hence, xt is a linear combination of (t+ 1) and has at most
(t+ 1)m nonzeros in total. We note that there have been recent theories on linear convergence of an
away-step variant of FW for (2) [4, 43], in which a succinct “vertex representation” [3, §3.2] must be
maintained through an additional, potentially costly reduction procedure. Initial trials suggest that it
does not work well for our specific convex programs and are therefore not considered further.
PG with Linesearch Linesearch is often essential for numerical efficiency of gradient-based
methods, especially when the Lipschitz constant cannot be computed. Here, we consider a modified
version of backtracking linesearch for PG (see, e.g., [3, §10.4.2] and [6, §1.4.3]). Specifically, given
increment factor α ≥ 1, decrement factor β ∈ (0, 1), and stepsize upper bound Γ > 0, at each
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iteration, set the (candidate) stepsize γt to either the previous one γt−1 or max{Γ, αγt−1}, depending
on whether backtracking occurs in the previous iteration. Then, perform the usual backtracking
with factor β until a sufficient decrease condition is met. denote the linesearch subroutine as
(xt+1, γt, kt) ← LSα,β,Γ(xt, γt−1, kt−1), where kt−1 is the number of backtracking steps in the
previous iteration, γ−1 = Γ, k−1 = 0. More details, as well as the proof of the following convergence
result (in fact, a more general one that holds for the proximal gradient method), is in Appendix
A.5. Let LXf = supx,y∈X , x 6=y
‖∇f(x)−∇f(y)‖
x−y ≤ L‖A‖2. Note that, in addition to ensure linear
convergence, linesearch can potentially improve the rate, since LXf can be much smaller than L‖A‖2.
Theorem 4 PG with linesearch LSα,β,Γ for (2) with q = 0 and q 6= 0 converges linearly with rate
1− µ
max{µ,H2/Γ,H2LXf /β}
(where H = HX (A)) and 1− 1max{1,2κ/Γ,2κLXf /β} , respectively. For both,
the number of projections ΠX per iteration is at most 1 +
log Γγ˜
log 1β
, where γ˜ := min
{
Γ, β/LXf
}
.
3 Linear utilities
We consider EG with ui(xi) = 〈vi, xi〉. Let v = [v1, . . . , vn] ∈ Rn×m be the matrix of all buyers’
valuations. Without loss of generality, from now on, we assume the following nondegeneracy
condition, that is, v does not contain any zero row or column. Then, the inequality constraints in
(1) can be replaced by equalities without affecting any optimal solution. Subsequently, EG with
linear utilities can be written as (2) with X = (∆n)m, f(x) = h(Ax), where x can be viewed
as a (nm)-dimensional vector, A ∈ Rn×nm is a block-diagonal matrix with i-th block being v>i ,
h(u) =
∑n
i=1 hi(ui), hi(ui) := −Bi log ui. Clearly, ‖A‖ = maxi ‖vi‖. However, in this way, h
does not have a Lipschitz continuous gradient on the interior of U = {Ax : x ∈ X}: for u ∈ int(U),
each ui can be arbitrarily close to 0. This can be circumvented by noticing the following.
Lemma 1 Let
¯
ui =
Bi‖vi‖1
‖B‖1 and u¯i = ‖vi‖1, i ∈ [n]. Any x ∈ X satisfies 〈vi, xi〉 ≤ u¯i for all i.
For any equilibrium allocation x∗, we have 〈vi, x∗i 〉 ≥ ¯ui for all i.
The proof is in Appendix B.2. Using Lemma 1, we can replace each hi by its “quadratic extrapolation”
instead: let h˜(z) :=
∑n
i=1 h˜i(ui), where
h˜i(ui) :=
{
1
2h
′′
i (¯
ui)(ui −
¯
ui)
2 + h′i(¯
ui)(ui −
¯
ui) + hi(
¯
ui) if ui ≤
¯
ui,
hi(ui) = −Bi log ui otherwise. (3)
In the above, clearly, we have h′′(
¯
ui) =
Bi
¯
u2i
> 0, h′(
¯
ui) = −Bi
¯
ui
and hi(
¯
ui) = −Bi log
¯
ui. Therefore,
h˜ is µ-strongly convex and smooth with L-Lipschitz continuous gradient on U , where µ = mini Bi‖vi‖21 ,
L = maxi
Bi
¯
u2i
= maxi
‖B‖21‖vi‖1
Bi
. We can then use the minimization objective f(x) = h˜(Ax) in (2)
instead, without affecting any optimal solution. Therefore, a direct application of Theorem 9 gives
the following convergence guarantee. A similar conclusion can also be made using Theorem 4 on PG
with linesearch for the same problem.
Theorem 5 Let X and A be as above. Then, PG for the problem minx∈X h˜(Ax) with constant
stepsize γt = 1L‖A‖2 converges linearly with rate 1− µmax{µ,LHX (A)2‖A‖2} , where ‖A‖ = maxi ‖vi‖.
Cost per iteration In every iteration (or linesearch step), PG requires computing the projection ΠX ,
which decomposes item-wise into Π∆n . This can be computed via an efficient O(n log n) sorting-
based algorithm [22, 19, 65] (in fact, only nonzero elements need to be sorted), whileO(n) algorithms
are also available [28, 11]. Furthermore, when v is sparse, that is, only a small subset of buyers Ij⊆ [n]
value each item j, the total cost for projection scales as O(
∑
j |Ij | log |Ij |) = O(nnz(v) log nnz(v)),
without explicit dependence on n,m. Clearly, this is also true for computing the utilities 〈vi, xi〉,
i ∈ [n]. Therefore, the cost per iteration scales with number of nonzeros nnz(v) without explicit de-
pendence on n,m. Furthermore, the gradient computation ∇f(x) = ∑i h˜′i(〈vi, xi〉)vi decomposes
buyer-wise and ΠX (x) = (Π∆n(x:,j)) decomposes item-wise, allowing straightforward paralleliza-
tion of PG. In facr, the same is easily seen to be true as well for subsequent QL and Lenontief
utilities.
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Convergent utilities and prices The equilibrium utilities u∗ are unique [29, Theorem 1]. So are the
equilibrium prices p∗. Furthermore, uti = 〈vi, xti〉 converges linearly to u∗ by strong convexity of h.
The simplex projection algorithm in each iteration yields a linearly convergent sequence of prices pt
in terms of relative price error ηt := maxj
|ptj−p∗j |
p∗j
. See Appendix B.3 for details.
Handling additional constraints Although efficient computation of ΠX depends on the structure
of X , it is still arguably more flexible compared to combinatorial algorithms for computing market
equilibrium, which depend crucially on the specific market setup (see, e.g., [63, 62]). For example,
the projection algorithms can be modified easily to handle constraints like
¯
xij ≤ xij ≤ x¯ij without
affecting the time complexity [52, 11]. This allows additional at-most-one constraints xij ≤ 1, useful
in in fair division applications [40]. Similar bounds on the individual bids bij (which denote how
much each buyer spends), such as spending constraints (see, e.g., [8, Eq. (2)] and [63]) can also be
incorporated without incurring additional cost (this requires solving the Shmyrev convex program
which we introduce in the appendix).
4 Quasi-linear utilities
In quasi-linear (QL) utilities, the money has value outside the market. In that case, each buyer
i has utility ui(xi) =
∑
j(vij − pj)xij , where pj is the price of item j. For notational brevity,
we assume that v > 0 but note that all results hold in the general case of nondegenerate v (no
zero row or column). A market equilibrium for QL utilities can be captured by a pair of primal
and dual convex programs [21, Lemma 5]. Here, we introduce the following convex program,
coined as QL-Shmyrev, which the dual of a reformulation of one in [21, Lemma 5]. Let the
bids be b = (b1, . . . , bn), where each bi = (bij) ∈ Rm. Denote pj(b) =
∑
i bij and p(b) =
(p1(b), . . . , pm(b)). Introduce slack variables δ = (δ1, . . . , δn) representing buyers’ leftover budgets.
Let B = {(b, δ) ∈ Rn×m × Rn : (bi, δi) ∈ ∆n+1, i ∈ [n]}.
ϕ∗ = min
b¯=(b,δ)
ϕ(b) = −
∑
i,j
(1 + log vij)bij +
∑
j
pj(b) log pj(b) s.t. b¯ ∈ B. (4)
The derivation is in Appendix C.1. This convex program parallels Shmyrev’s (19) for linear utilities.
Note that the objective function does not involve δ. In order to apply PG, we need a (µ,L)-s.c.
objective, while the function h(p) =
∑
j pj log pj does not have Lipschitz continuous gradient on
{p(b) : (b, δ) ∈ B}, since any pj(b) can be arbitrarily small. Analogous to Lemma 1 and 12, we
establish the following bounds on equilibrium prices. Furthermore, we show that the equilibrium
prices are unique and can also be easily computed from the bids.
Lemma 2 The equilibrium prices p∗ under QL utilities (with nondegenerate v) are unique. Let
¯
pj = maxi
vijBi
‖vi‖1+Bi and p¯j = maxi vij for all j. For any optimal solution (b
∗, δ∗) to (4), we have
¯
pj ≤ p∗j = pj(b∗) ≤ p¯j .
The proof is in Appendix C.2. To cast (4) into the standard form (2), we take X = B, the linear map
A : (b, δ) 7→ (p1(b), . . . , pm(b)), h(p) =
∑
j pj log pj and q = (qij), qij = −1− log vij . Viewing
(b, δ) as a n(m+ 1)-dimensional vector concatenating each bi and δ, we have A := [I, . . . , I, 0] ∈
Rn×(n(m+1)) and ‖A‖ = n. Then, replace h with a (µ,L)-.s.c. h˜ via a smooth extrapolation similar
to that in §3, where µ = 1maxj p¯j and L =
1
minj
¯
pj
. Let ϕ˜(b) = −∑i,j(1 + log vij)bij +∑j h˜(p(b))
(which is viewed as a function of b¯ = (b, δ) in the following theorem). Note that ϕ(b) = ϕ˜(b) as long
as p(b) ∈ [
¯
p, p¯]. By Theorem 3 and Lemma 2, we have the following.
Theorem 6 Let (b0, δ0) satisfies p(b0) ∈ [
¯
p, p¯]. Then, PG with stepsize γt = 1Ln2 for the problem
min(b,δ)∈B ϕ˜(b) converges linearly with rate 1− 1max{1,2κLn2} , where
κ = HX (A)2
(
C + 2GD + 2(G
2+1)
µ
)
, C = ϕ(b0)− ϕ∗,
G = ‖∇h˜(p∗)‖, D = sup(b,δ),(b′,δ′)∈B ‖p(b)− p(b′)‖.
Remark Some constants can be bounded explicitly. Clearly, D ≤
√∑
j(maxi vij)
2. By Lemma 2,
h˜(p∗) = h(p∗), since p∗ ∈ [
¯
p, p¯]. Therefore, G =
√∑
j(1 + log p
∗
j )
2 ≤
√∑
j(1 + log maxi vij)
2.
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PR Dynamics Similar to [8], we can also apply MD to (4) and obtain a PR dynamics under QL
utilities with O(1/T ) convergence in both objective value ϕ(bt) − ϕ∗ and price error D(pt‖p∗).
Recall that MD for (22) with unit stepsize γt = 1 performs the following update:
(bt+1, δt+1) = arg min
(b,δ)∈B
〈∇ϕ(bt), b− bt〉+D(b, δ‖bt, δt), (5)
where D(b′, δ′‖b, δ) = ∑i,j b′ij log b′ijbij +∑i δ′i log δ′iδi is the usual KL divergence. Extending (and
slightly strengthening) [8, Eq. (13) and (16)], we first establish the following last-iterate convergence
in objective value and price error. Its proof is in Appendix C.3.
Theorem 7 Let b0ij =
Bi
m+1 , δ
0
i =
Bi
m+1 for all i, j. Then, MD applied to (4) generates iterates
(bt, δt), t = 1, 2, . . . such that D(p(bt)‖p∗) ≤ ϕ(bt)− ϕ∗ ≤ ‖B‖1 log(m+1)t for all t.
The MD update (5) leads to a form of PR dynamics [67, 8] as follows (see Appendix C.4 for the
derivation). At time t, buyers first submit their bids bt = (btij). Then, item prices are computed via
ptj =
∑
j b
t
ij . Next, each buyer is allocated x
t
ij = b
t
ij/p
t
j amount of item j. Finally, the bids and
leftover budgets are updated via
bt+1ij = Bi ·
vijx
t
ij∑
` vi`x
t
i` + δ
t
i
, δt+1i = Bi ·
δti∑
` vi`x
t
i` + δ
t
i
. (6)
Convergence of prices and a tractable bound Similar to the linear case, PG for QL utilities also
yields pt with relative error ηt converging linearly to 0. Furthermore, it can be bounded explicitly by
computable quantities. See Appendix C.5 for details.
5 Leontief utilities
Leontief utilities model perfectly complementary items and are suitable for resource sharing scenarios
where utilities are capped by dominant resources. The utility function is ui(xi) = minj∈Ji
xij
aij
, where
aij > 0 for all j ∈ Ji 6= ∅. Denote Ij = {i ∈ [n] : j ∈ Ji} and assume that Ij 6= ∅ for all j, without
loss of generality. Let ai = (aij) ∈ Rm, where aij := 0 if j /∈ Ji and a = [a>1 ; . . . , a>n ] ∈ Rn×m.
Under Leontief utilities, EG (1) can be written in terms of the utilities u ∈ Rn (see (33) in Appendix
D.1), whose dual, after reformulation, is
min f(p) = −
∑
i
Bi log〈ai, p〉 s.t. p ∈ P, (7)
where P = {p ∈ Rm+ :
∑
j pj = ‖B‖1}. The derivation is in Appendix D.1. In particular, we use the
fact that ‖p∗‖1 = ‖B‖1 at equilibrium. Similar to the case of linear utilities, we have the following.
Lemma 3 For any p ∈ P , it holds that 〈ai, p〉 ≤ r¯i := ‖B‖1‖ai‖∞ for all i. Furthermore, for any
equilibrium prices p∗, it holds that 〈ai, p∗〉 ≥
¯
ri := Bi‖ai‖∞ for all i.
The proof is in Appendix D.2. Again, using Lemma 3, we can use a simple quadratic extrapolation to
construct a (µ,L)-s.c. function h˜ with µ = mini Bir¯i , L = maxi
Bi
¯
ri
without affecting any optimal
solution. Clearly, a Lipschitz constant of the gradient of f(p) = h˜(ap) is L‖a‖2. Analogous to
Theorem 5, we have the following convergence guarantee for Leontief utilities. Here, equilibrium
prices may not be unique. However, by (33), the equilibrium utilities u∗ are. We can construct ut
that converges linearly to u∗. See Appendix D.3 for details.
Theorem 8 PG with fixed stepsize γt = 1L‖a‖2 for the problem minp∈P h˜(ap) converges linearly at
a rate 1− µmax{µ,LHP(a)2‖a‖2} .
6 Experiments
We perform numerical experiments on market instances under all three utilities with various generated
parameters. The algorithms are PGLS (PG with linesearch LSα,β,Γ, see Appendix A.5), PR and
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FW (with exact linesearch). For linear utilities, we generate market data v = (vij) where vij are
i.i.d. from standard Gaussian, uniform, exponential, or lognormal distribution. For each of the sizes
n = 50, 100, 150, 200 (on the horizontal axis) and m = 2n, we generate 30 instances with unit
budgets Bi = 1 and random budgets Bi = 0.5 + B˜i (where B˜i follows the same distribution as vij).
For QL utilities, we repeat the above (same random v, same sizes and termination conditions) using
budgets Bi = 5(1 + B˜i). The termination criterion is either (i) (pt, p∗) = maxi
|pti−p∗i |
p∗i
≤ η, where
p∗ are the prices computed by CVXPY+Mosek [26, 48, 25], or (ii) average duality gap dgapt/n ≤ η,
for various thresholds values η. For PGLS, we report the number of linesearch iterations (that is, the
total number of projection computations). For other algorithms, we report the number of iterations.
As a fair comparison, we use the same parameters α, β,Γ for PGLS throughout without handpicking.
The plots report average numbers of iterations to reach the termination condition and their standard
errors across k = 30 repeats. In Appendix E we show: more details on the setup, additional plots and
plots for experiments under Leontief utilities.
As can be seen, for linear utilities, PR is more efficient for obtaining an approximate solution (i.e.,
termination at (pt, p∗) ≤ 10−2 or dgapt/n ≤ 10−3). When higher accuracy is required, PGLS
takes far fewer iterations. For QL utilities, PR is more efficient in most cases, except when very high
accuracy is required (dgapt/n ≤ 5× 10−6). We do not show FW for the QL case, as it performed
extremely badly. In the appendix, we see that for Leontief utilities, PGLS with linesearch terminates
within tens of iterations in all cases.
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7 Conclusions
We investigate the computation of market equilibria under different buyer utility assumptions using
simple first-order methods. Through convex optimization duality and properties of market equilibria,
we show that the associated convex programs can be reformulated into structured forms suitable
for FOMs. We show that projected gradient achieves linear convergence for these reformulations,
through weakened strong-convexity conditions. As a technical contribution on FOMs, we also prove
a more general linear convergence result of proximal gradient with linesearch under the Proximal-PŁ
condition. For QL utilities, we derive a form of Proportional Response through Mirror Descent on
a convex optimization formulation, extending the classical convergence results for linear utilities.
Finally, extensive numerical experiments compare the efficiency of the FOMs for various low- and
high-accuracy termination criteria.
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A Preliminaries
We list and prove a few elementary lemmas used in subsequent proofs and discussions.
Lemma 4 Let n ≥ m, A ∈ Rm×n and b ∈ Rm be such that S = {x ∈ Rn : Ax = b} 6= ∅. Let the
singular value decomposition (SVD) ofA> beA> = UΣV >, where U ∈ Rn×r and V ∈ Rm×r have
orthonormal columns, Σ = Diag(σ1, . . . , σr), σ1 ≥ . . . σr > 0, r = rank(A). For any x ∈ Rn, the
projection of x onto S can be expressed as
ΠS(x) = (I − UU>)x+ UΣ−1V >b.
In particular, when A has full rank,
ΠS(x) = (I −A>(AA>)−1A)x+A>(AA>)−1b.
Proof. The case of full rank A is well-known, see, e.g., [54, Eq. (1)]. For general A, Ax = b ⇔
V ΣU>x = b. Recall that U and V consist of orthonormal columns and. Since V Σ has full column
rank, there exists a unique w ∈ Rr such that V Σw = b. In fact, w = Σ−1V >b. Therefore,
Ax = b⇔ U>x = Σ−1V >b.
Since U> has full row rank, the formula follows directly from the full rank case. 
Lemma 5 Under the same assumptions as Lemma 4, for any x ∈ Rn, it holds that
σr · ‖x−ΠS(x)‖ ≤ ‖Ax− b‖.
Proof. By Lemma (4) and the fact that U and V have orthonormal columns,
‖x−ΠS(x)‖ = ‖U(U>x− Σ−1V >b)‖ = ‖U>x− Σ−1V >b‖
= ‖Σ−1V >(Ax− b)‖ ≤ ‖Σ−1‖‖Ax− b‖,
where ‖Σ−1‖ = 1σr . 
Lemma 6 For B > 0 and g ∈ Rd, let
x∗ = arg min
{
〈g, x〉+
d∑
i=1
xi log xi : x ≥ 0, 1>x = B
}
.
Then, x∗i = B · e
−gi∑
` e
−g` , i ∈ [d].
Proof. It can be easily verified via KKT optimality conditions. The Lagrangian is
L(x, λ) = 〈g, x〉+
∑
i
xi log xi − λ(1>x−B).
By the first-order condition, for any λ, the minimizer x(λ) of L(x, λ) has xi(λ) = eλ−1−gi . Primal
feasibility implies
∑
i xi(λ) = B ⇒ eλ = B∑
i e
−(1+gi) . Therefore,
x∗i = B ·
e−gi∑
` e
−g` .

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A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Consider the minimization form of (1). Let pj ≥ 0 be the dual variable associated with constraint∑
i xij ≤ 1. The Lagrangian is
L(x, p) =
−∑
i
Bi log ui(x) +
〈
p,
∑
i
xi
〉
−
∑
j
pj
 .
The Lagrangian dual is
max
p≥0
g(p) := min
x≥0
L(x, p). (8)
By assumption, there is a feasible x to (1) with ui(xi) > 0 for all i. Note that x′ = 12x is also feasible
and ui(x′i) =
1
2ui(xi) > 0 by homogeneity of ui. Consider x
′′ = x′ + δ, where δ > 0 is sufficiently
small so that
∑
i x
′′
ij < 1 for all j. Then, x
′′ > 0 and
∑
i x
′′
ij < 1 for all j. Therefore, (1) has a
strictly feasible solution. Meanwhile, the dual (8) clearly has a strictly feasible solution p > 0 with
g(p) = minx≥0 L(x, p) finite. Therefore, strong duality holds by Slater’s condition and the KKT
conditions are necessary and sufficient for (primal and dual) optimality of a solution pair (x, p) (see,
e.g., [7, Appendix D]). Let x∗ and p∗ be optimal solutions to the primal (1) and dual (8), respectively.
Clearly, ui(x∗i ) > 0 for all i. By Lagrange duality, we have
x∗ ∈ arg min
x≥0
L(x, p∗).
In other words, each x∗i maximizes ri(xi, p
∗) := Bi log ui(xi)− 〈p∗, xi〉 on xi ≥ 0. We show that
(x∗, p∗) is a market equilibrium.
Buyer optimality First, we verify that 〈p∗, x∗i 〉 = Bi for all i. Assume that 〈p∗, x∗i 〉 > Bi for
some i. Let x˜i = (1− )x∗i , where 0 ≤  < 1. Consider
φ() = Bi log ui((1−)x∗i )−〈p∗, (1−)x∗i 〉 = Bi log ui(x∗i )−〈p∗, x∗i 〉+Bi log(1−)+〈p∗, x∗i 〉.
Note that φ is differentiable on (0, 1) and φ′() = − Bi1− + 〈p∗, x∗i 〉. Since 〈p∗, x∗i 〉 > Bi, we have
φ′(0) > 0. In other words, replacing x∗i by x˜i with sufficiently small  strictly decreases the value
of Bi log ui(xi) − 〈p∗, xi〉, contradicting to the choice of x∗. Therefore, 〈x∗, x∗i 〉 ≤ Bi for all i.
Completely analogously, we can also show that 〈p∗, x∗i 〉 ≥ Bi for all i. Therefore, for each buyer i,
x∗i is feasible and depletes its budget Bi under prices p
∗
i . Hence, for any xi ∈ Rm+ , 〈p∗, xi〉 ≤ Bi,
since x∗i maximizes ri(·, p∗), we have
Bi log ui(x
∗
i )− 〈p∗, x∗i 〉 ≥ Bi log ui(xi)− 〈p∗, xi〉.
Since 〈p∗, xi〉 ≤ Bi = 〈p∗, x∗i 〉, the above implies
Bi log ui(x
∗
i ) ≥ Bi log ui(xi).
Therefore, ui(x∗i ) ≥ ui(xi). In other words, x∗i ∈ Di(p∗) for all i.
Market clearance By the complementary slackness condition in Lagrange duality, for item j such
that
∑
i x
∗
ij < 1, it must holds that p
∗
j = 0, completing the proof.
Remark We can also assign any leftover of item j to any buyer i without violating its budget
constraint, in order to “clear” the market. Meanwhile, since ui is CCNH, it is also “monotone” in the
following sense: for any α ≥ 0,
ui(x
∗
i + αe
j) ≥ ui(x∗i ) + αui(ej) ≥ 0.
In other words, buyer i’s optimality is not affected by the assignment of any zero-price leftover.
A.2 Characterizations of Hoffman constant
We compare our definition of Hoffman constant and another common, explicit characterization.
Recall that HX (A) is the smallest H such that, for any b, S = {x : Ax = b},
‖x−ΠX∩S(x)‖ ≤ H‖Ax− b‖, ∀x ∈ X .
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For any matrix M , let B(M) be the set of nonsingular submatrices consisting of rows of M . Define
H(M) = max
B∈B(M)
1
σmin(B)
<∞. (9)
The following fact is known (see, e.g., [34, §11.8] and [4, §2.1]).
Lemma 7 Suppose the reference polyhedral set can be represented by inequality constraints X =
{x : Cx ≤ d}. Then,
HX (A) ≤ H
([
A
C
])
.
Clearly, H(M) is finite for any M . In fact, this is the most well-known characterization of Hoffman
constant, and is tight in the following sense: let S = {x : Ax = b} for some arbitrary right hand side
b, then it is the smallest constant H such that
‖x−ΠX∩S(x)‖ ≤ H
∥∥∥∥[ Ax− b(Cx− d)+
]∥∥∥∥
for all x (not necessarily ∈ X ). However, for all of our purposes, that is, analysis of PG, x is always
restricted to be ∈ X . Therefore, we choose to define HX (A) as such, consistent with [5] and [53].
Meanwhile, the following is clear.
Lemma 8 For any matrices A ∈ Rm×n, m ≤ n and C ∈ R`×n, it holds that
H
([
A
C
])
≥ max
{
1
σmin(A)
, H(A)
}
.
Proof. By definition (9), H ′ := H
([
A
C>
])
≥ H(A). If rank(A) = m, then H ′ ≥ 1σmin(A)
because A ∈ B
([
A
C
])
. If r = rank(A) < m, let the (nonzero) singular values of A be σ1 ≥ · · · ≥
σr = σmin(A) > 0. Consider any B ∈ B(A) ⊆ B
([
A
C
])
with rank r (having exactly r rows), let
its nonzero singular values be σ′1 ≥ · · · ≥ σ′r = σmin(B) > 0. Applying Cauhchy’s Interlacing
Theorem (see, e.g., [31, Theorem 1]) on AA> and its principal submatrix BB>, we have
σ1 ≥ σ′1 ≥ · · · ≥ σr ≥ σ′r.
Therefore, H ′ ≥ 1σmin(B) ≥ 1σmin(A) . 
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
We follow the development in [38, §4 & Appendix F] and further articulate the constants. There, the
authors show that proximal gradient achieves linear convergence under the so-called Proximal-PŁ
inequality. Consider the following general nonsmooth problem
F ∗ = min
x
F (x) = f(x) + g(x) (10)
where f is smooth convex with Lf -Lipschitz continuous gradient, g is simple closed proper convex
and dom g ⊆ dom f . One iteration of the proximal gradient method with stepsize γ > 0 is as
follows:
xt+1 = Proxg
(
xt − γ∇f(xt)) = arg min
x
[
〈γ∇f(x), x− xt〉+ 1
2
‖x− xt‖2 + g(x)
]
. (11)
For any α > 0 and any x ∈ dom g, define
D(x, α) = −2αmin
x′
[
〈∇f(x), x′ − x〉+ α
2
‖x′ − x‖2 + g(x′)− g(x)
]
. (12)
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Say that F = f + g satisfies the proximal-PŁ inequality at x w.r.t. Λ ≥ λ > 0 if
1
2
D(x,Λ) ≥ λ(F (x)− F ∗), (13)
Below is essentially [38, Theorem 5], which shows that the so-called Proximal-PŁ condition is
sufficient for linear convergence. Note that, different from [38, Theorem 5], we only require (13) to
hold for x ∈ X such that F (x) ≤ F (x0) instead of all x ∈ X . In addition, we note that in some
cases (13) may hold with Λ > Lf , in which case the rate needs to be slightly adjusted. Since D(x, ·)
is monotone [38, Lemma 1], (13) holds when Γ is replaced by Γ′ ≥ Γ. The statement and proof are
the same as [38, pp. 9] otherwise.
Theorem 9 Let x0 ∈ dom g. If f and g satisfies (13) for all x ∈ dom g such that F (x) ≤ F (x0),
then xt defined by (11) starting from x0 with constant stepsize γ = 1/Lf converges linearly with
rate 1− λ
L¯
, where L¯ = max{Λ, Lf}. In other words,
F (xt)− F ∗ ≤
(
1− λ
L¯
)t
(F (x0)− F ∗), t = 1, 2, . . .
Proof. By assumption, (13) holds for all x ∈ dom g, x ≤ F (x0). In particular, it holds for xt,
t, 1, 2, . . . , since proximal gradient is a descent method, i.e., F (x0) ≥ F (x1) ≥ . . . (see, e.g., [3,
Corollary 10.18]). Therefore, by Lf -Lipschitz continuity of ∇f , proximal gradient update (11),
definition of D(x, ·), its monotonicity, and (13) for all xt,
F (xt+1) ≤ F (xt) + 〈∇f(xt), xt+1 − xt〉+ Lf
2
‖xt+1 − xt‖2 + g(xt+1)− g(xt)
≤ F (xt) +
[
〈∇f(xt), xt+1 − xt〉+ L¯
2
‖xt+1 − xt‖2 + g(xt+1)− g(xt)
]
≤ F (xt)− 1
2L¯
D(xt, L¯)
≤ F (xt)− λ
L¯
(
F (xt)− F ∗)
⇒ F (xt+1)− F ∗ ≤
(
1− λ
L¯
)(
F (xt)− F ∗) .
Repeatedly applying the above inequality completes the proof. 
Then, we prove Theorem 2. Clearly, problem (2) is (10) with g(x) = δX (x) and PG is a special
case of proximal gradient. By Theorem 9, in order to prove Theorem 2, it suffices to establish the
Proximal-PŁ condition (13) (for all x ∈ X , f(x) ≤ f(x0) for some initial iterate x0). Let X ∗ be the
set of optimal solutions to (2) and f∗ be the optimal objective value. Since h is µ-strongly convex and
f(x) = h(Ax), there exists z∗ ∈ dom f such that S = {x : Ax = z∗} and X ∗ = X ∩ S . Therefore,
for any x ∈ X , xp := ΠX∗(x), we have
f(xp) = h(Axp) ≥ h(Ax) + 〈∇h(Ax), A(xp − x)〉+ µ
2
‖A(xp − x)‖2.
Note that
〈∇h(Ax), A(xp − x)〉 = 〈A>∇h(Ax), xp − x〉 = 〈∇f(x), xp − x〉.
Hence, for any x ∈ X , by strong convexity of h and definition of H = HX (A), we have
f(xp) ≥ f(x) + 〈∇f(x), xp − x〉+ µ
2
‖A(x− xp)‖2
= f(x) + 〈∇f(x), xp − x〉+ µ
2
‖Ax− z∗‖2
≥ f(x) + 〈∇f(x), xp − x〉+ µ
2H2
‖x− xp‖2,
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Therefore,
f∗ ≥ f(x) + 〈∇f(x), xp − x〉+ µ
2H2
‖x− xp‖2
≥ f(x) + min
y∈X
{
〈∇f(x), y − x〉+ µ
2H2
‖y − x‖2
}
≥ f(x)− H
2
2µ
D
(
x,
µ
H2
)
⇒ 1
2
D
(
x,
µ
H2
)
≥ µ
H2
(f(x)− f∗).
Thus, (13) holds for all x ∈ X , f(x) ≤ f(x0) with
Λ = λ =
µ
H2
.
Since∇f(x) = A>∇h(Ax) and h is (µ,L)-s.c., its Lipschitz constant can be chosen as
Lf = L‖A‖2.
By Theorem 9, PG with stepsize γ = 1Lf converges linearly with rate
1−
µ
H2
max
{
µ
H2 , L‖A‖2
} = 1− µ
max{µ,LH2‖A‖2} .
Finally, convergence of the distance to optimality ‖xt −ΠX (xt)‖ is straightforward: for any x ∈ X ,
by the strong convexity of h and definition of H ,
f(x)− f∗ = h(Ax)− h(Axp) ≥ µ
2
‖Ax−Axp‖2 = µ
2
‖Ax− z∗‖2 ≥ µ
2H
‖x− xp‖2.

Remark A special case is when d ≥ r (recall that A ∈ Rd×r) and rank(A) = r. In this case,
f(x) = h(Ax) itself is strongly convex with modulus µσmin(A)2. In this case, classical analysis (e.g.,
[3, §10.6]) implies linear convergence with rate 1− µσmin(A)2L‖A‖2 . Meanwhile, in the above analysis, we
have X ∗ = {x∗} = S = {x : Ax = z∗} = X ∩ S (since x∗, z∗ are unique and rank(A) = r). By
Lemma 5, for any x, it holds that
‖x−ΠX∗(x)‖ ≤ 1
σmin(A)2
‖Ax− z∗‖.
Therefore, by the definition of Hoffman constant, HX (A) ≤ 1σmin(A)2 and the classical rate under
strong convexity is recovered.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3
Let X ∗ be the set of optimal solutions to (2). First, recall the following lemma [64, Lemma 14],
which ensures the first part of the theorem, that is, uniqueness of Ax∗ and q>x∗ for all x∗ ∈ X ∗.
Lemma 9 There exist unique z∗ ∈ Rr and w∗ ∈ R such that for any x∗ ∈ X ∗,
Ax∗ = z∗, 〈q∗, x〉 = w∗.
The next lemma is essentially [4, Lemma 2.5]. Different from the statement of [4, Lemma 2.5],
we keep ‖∇h(z∗)‖ instead of bounding it by supx∈X ‖∇h(Ax)‖. We also define C = f(x0)− f∗
instead of C = supx∈X f(x) − f∗, since subsequent application of the lemma only involves PG
iterates xt, which have monotone decreasing objective values f(x0) ≥ f(x1) ≥ . . . The proof
remains unchanged otherwise.
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Lemma 10 Let z∗ be as in Lemma 9 and x0 ∈ X . For any x ∈ X such that f(x) ≤ f(x0), it holds
that
‖x−ΠX∗(x)‖2 ≤ κ (f(x)− f∗) ,
where, same as in Theorem 3, κ = HX (A)2
(
C + 2GDA +
2(G2+1)
µ
)
, C = f(x0)− f∗,
G = ‖∇h(z∗)‖, DA = supx,y∈X ‖A(x− y)‖.
Finally, take Lf = L‖A‖2 as a Lipschitz constant of ∇f . By Lemma 10 and [38, §4.1], it holds that
(2) satisfies the proximal-PŁ inequality (13) with
Λ = λ =
1
2κ
for all x ∈ X such that f(x) ≤ f(x0) (in particular, for all xt, t = 1, 2, . . . ). By Theorem 9, PG
converges linearly with rate 1− λmax{Λ,Lf} = 1− 1max{1,2κL‖A‖2} .
Remark Lemma 10 shows that QG holds. Similar convergence guarantees can also be derived
from other QG-based analysis, e.g., [27, Corollary 3.7].
A.5 Linear convergence of PG with linesearch
First, we consider the more general proximal gradient setup (10). Let Lf be a Lipschitz constant
of ∇f and the Proximal-PŁ inequality 13 holds with Λ ≥ λ ≥ 0 for all x ∈ dom g such that
F (x) ≤ F (x0). Let α ≥ 1, β ∈ (0, 1), Γ > 0 (increment factor, decrement factor, upper bound on
stepsize, respectively). The linesearch subroutine LSα,β,Γ is defined in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 xt+1, γt, kt ← LSα,β,Γ(x, γ, kprev) with parameters α ≥ 1, β ∈ (0, 1), Γ > 0.
If kprev = 0, set γ(0) = min{αγ,Γ}. Otherwise, set γ(0) = γ.
For k = 0, 1, 2, . . .
1. Compute x(k) = Proxλ(k)g(x− γ(k)∇f(x)).
2. Break if
f(x(k)) ≤ f(x) + 〈∇f(x), x(k) − x〉+ 1
2γ(k)
‖x(k) − x‖2. (14)
3. Set γ(k+1) = βγ(k) and continue to k + 1.
Return xt+1 = x(k), γt = γ(k), kt = k.
In this way, proximal gradient with linesearch can be described formally as follows: starting from
x0 ∈ dom f , γ−1 = Γ, k−1 = 0, perform the following iterations
(xt+1, γt, kt)← LSα,β,Γ(xt, γt−1, kt−1), t = 1, 2, . . .
Note that (14) holds for any γ(k) ≤ 1Lf (see, e.g., [3, Theorem 10.16]). Therefore, Algorithm 1
terminates when γ(0)βk ≤ 1Lf . This means
γt ≥ γ˜ := min
{
Γ,
β
Lf
}
. (15)
for all t. Note that we explicitly include the case of Γ ≤ 1Lf , although in practice Γ is often set very
large. Clearly,
Γβk ≤ γ˜ ⇔ k ≥
log Γγ˜
log 1β
.
Therefore, in Algorithm 1, the backtracking iteration index satisfies kt ≤ log
Γ
γ˜
log 1β
for all t. Note that if
the loop breaks at kt, the number of Prox evaluations is exactly kt + 1.
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Let
L¯ = max
{
1
γ˜
,Λ
}
= max
{
1
Γ
,
Lf
β
,Λ
}
. (16)
Then, monotonicity of D(x, ·) implies, for all x ∈ dom g such that F (x) ≤ F (x0),
1
2
D(x, L¯) ≥ 1
2
D(x,Λ) ≥ λ (F (x)− F ∗) .
Following the proof of Theorem 9 (or that of [38, Theorem 5]), we have
F (xt+1) ≤ F (xt) + 〈∇f(xt), xt+1 − xt〉+ Lf
2
‖xt+1 − xt‖2 + g(xt+1)− g(xt)
≤ F (xt) + 〈∇f(xt), xt+1 − xt〉+ L¯
2
‖xt+1 − xt‖2 + g(xt+1)− g(xt)
≤ F (xt)− 1
2L¯
D (xt, L¯)
≤ F (xt)− λ
L¯
(F (xt)− F ∗)
⇒ F (xt+1)− F ∗ ≤
(
1− λ
L¯
)(
F (xt)− F ∗) .
Summarizing the above discussion, we have the following convergence guarantee for PG with
linesearch.
Theorem 10 Let α ≥ 1, β ∈ (0, 1) and Γ > 0. For problem (10) satisfying the Proximal-
PŁinequality with Λ ≥ λ > 0 for all x ∈ dom g such that F (x) ≤ F (x0), proximal gradient
(11) with linesearch subroutine LSα,β,Γ described in Algorithm 1 generates iterates xt such that
F (xt+1)− F ∗ ≤
(
1− λ
L¯
)t (
F (x0)− F ∗) , t = 1, 2, . . . , (17)
where L¯ is defined in (16). Furthermore, each iteration requires at most 1 +
log Γγ˜
log 1β
number of Prox
evaluations.
Proof of Theorem 4. In the above discussion, when g(x) = δX (x), we can replace the Lipschitz
constant Lf by the restricted one LXf throughout, since Algorithm 1 ensures x
t ∈ X for all t. It
remains to apply Theorem 10. For q = 0, Λ = λ = µH2 and L¯ = max
{
1
Γ ,
LXf
β ,
µ
H2
}
. Therefore, the
rate is
1− λ
L¯
= 1− µ
max{µ,H2/Γ, H2LXf /β}
.
For q 6= 0, Λ = λ = 12κ and L¯ = max
{
1
Γ ,
LXf
β ,
1
2κ
}
. Therefore, the rate is
1− 1
max{1, 2κLXf /β, 2κ/Γ}
.

A.6 Other utility functions
Recall that, by Theorem (1), for any CCNH utilities ui, optimal solutions to the EG convex program
(1) correspond to equilibrium allocation and prices.
CES utilities are parametrized by a nondegenerate v and exponent ρ ∈ (−∞, 1]\{0}:
ui(xi) =
 m∑
j=1
vijx
ρ
ij
1/ρ .
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Clearly, ρ = 1 gives linear utilities. For ρ < 1, it has been shown that Proportional Response
dynamics achieves linear convergence in prices and utilities [67, Theorem 4] under their notion of
-approximate market equilibrium [67, pp. 2693].
Cobb-Douglas utilities represent substitutive items and take the following form, for parameters
λ = (λi), λi ∈ ∆m:
ui(xi) = Πjx
λij
ij .
In this case, EG (1) decomposes item-wise into simple problems with explicit solutions. Specifically,
for each item j, the minimization problem is
min
x:,j∈∆n
−
∑
i
Biλij log xij .
Let pj be the Lagrangian multiplier associated with constraint
∑
i xij = 1. The Lagrangian is
L(x:,j , pj) = −
∑
i
Biλij log xij + pj
(∑
i
xij − 1
)
.
By first-order stationarity condition, for any pj ∈ R, L(x:,j , pj) is minimized when
xij =
Biλij
pj
. (18)
Substituting it into L and discarding the constants w.r.t. pj , we have
g(pj) =
(∑
i
Biλij
)
log pj − pj ,
which is maximized at equilibrium prices
p∗j =
∑
i
Biλij .
Therefore, by 18, the equilibrium x∗ under Cobb-Douglas utilities is given by
x∗ij =
Biλij∑
iBiλij
, ∀ i, j.
B Linear utilities
B.1 Shmyrev’s convex program
Under linear utilities, it turns out that we can also compute market equilibrium via the following
convex program due to Shmyrev [58, 8]. In this convex program, the variables are the bids bij , i ∈ [n],
j ∈ [m] and prices pj , j ∈ [m].
max
∑
i,j
bij log vij −
∑
j
pj log pj s.t.
∑
i
bij = pj , j ∈ [m],
∑
j
bij = Bi, i ∈ [n], b ≥ 0.
(19)
Given an optimal solution b∗, equilibrium prices and allocations are then given by p∗j =
∑
i b
∗
ij and
x∗ij =
b∗ij
p∗j
, respectively.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Any x ∈ X satisfies x ≤ 1. Therefore, 〈vi, xi〉 ≤ ‖vi‖1‖x∗i ‖∞ ≤ ‖vi‖1 = u¯i. For the lower bound,
recall that at an equilibrium allocation x∗ ensures that every buyer gets at least the utility of the
proportional share, that is,
〈vi, x∗i 〉 ≥
〈
vi,
Bi
‖B‖11
〉
=
Bi‖vi‖1
‖B‖1 = ¯ui.
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B.3 Uniqueness of equilibrium quantities and convergence of ut, pt
Convergence of ut to u∗ can be easily seen as follows. Let xt be the PG iterates and h˜,A, f = h˜(Ax),
µ be defined as in §3 and f∗ = minx∈X f(x). Since h˜ is µ-strongly convex, we have
µ
2
‖ut − u∗‖2 ≤ h˜(ut)− h˜(u∗) ≤ h˜(Axt)− f∗,
which converges linearly. Next, we show uniqueness of p∗ via simple arguments and construct a
sequence of linearly convergent prices pt.
Lemma 11 Assume that v is nondegenerate. Then, the equilibrium prices p∗ under linear utilities
are unique.
Proof. By Theorem 1 and [21, Lemma 3], p∗ is an optimal solution (together with some β∗) to the
following problem (dual of (1) with linear utilities): 
min
p, β
∑
j
pj −
∑
i
Bi log βi s.t. p ≥ 0, β ≥ 0, pj ≥ vijβi, ∀ i, j. (20)
Here, strong duality holds since there clearly exist primal and dual strictly feasible solutions with
finite objective values given nondegenerate v (c.f. Theorem 1 and Appendix A.1). We can eliminate
p by letting pj = maxi vijβi for all j and rewrite (20) as
min
β
∑
j
max
i
vijβj −
∑
i
Bi log βi s.t. β ≥ 0.
In the above, since the objective is strongly convex and the feasible region is β ≥ 0, the optimal
solution β∗ is clearly unique. Furthermore, it must hold that β∗ > 0 (since the optimal objective
value is finite and strong duality holds). For p∗ optimal to (20), it must hold that p∗j = maxi vijβ
∗
i .
In fact, p∗j ≥ maxi vijβ∗i by feasibility and, for any strict inequality, decreasing the corresponding p∗j
strictly decreases the objective. 
The following lemma provides simple upper and lower bounds on feasible and equilibrium prices,
respectively. The lower bounds are slightly strengthened over the existing one [8, Lemma 17].
Lemma 12 Let p∗ be equilibrium prices under linear utilities with nondegenerate valuations v. Then,
¯
pj ≤ p∗j ≤ p¯j for all j, where
¯
pj = maxi
vijBi
‖vi‖1 and p¯j = ‖B‖1.
Proof. It is essentially the same as the proof of Lemma 2, except that, at optimality, ui ≤ ‖vi‖1 +Bi
can be strengthened to ui ≤ ‖vi‖1 (utility of each buyer is at most that of having a unit of every item).

A linearly convergent sequence of pt Here, all norms are vector norms. Note that each step of PG
is of the form xt+1 = ΠX (x¯t), where x¯t = xt − γ∇f(xt). Since ∇f is Lf -Lipschitz, the mapping
φ1 : x 7→ x− γ∇f(xt)
is Lipschitz continuous (w.r.t. ‖ · ‖2) with constant 1 + γLf = 2 (where γ = 1L‖A‖2 is the fixed
stepsize). Meanwhile, we have the following.
Lemma 13 Let y ∈ Rn and y∗ = Π∆n(y). There exists a unique multiplier λ ∈ R, which can be
computed in O(n log n) time, such that
n∑
i=1
(yi − λ)+ = 1. (21)
Moreover, the mapping φ2 : y 7→ λ is piecewise linear and 1-Lipschitz continuous w.r.t. ‖ · ‖1.
Proof. By the KKT conditions for simplex projection (see, e.g., [65, §3]), it holds that there exists
unique λ such that
y∗ = (y − λ1)+.
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Suppose there exists λ1 < λ2 that satisfy (21). Then, since the left-hand side of (21), denoted as
w(λ), is monotone decreasing in λ, it must hold that w(λ) = 1 for all λ ∈ [λ1, λ2]. In other words,
w(·) is constant on [w1, w2]. This further implies w(λ) = 0 for all w ∈ [w1, w2], a contradiction.
Therefore, λ = φ2(y) is uniquely defined. Let I+(y), I0(y), I−(y) denote the set of indices i ∈ [n]
such that yi > λ, yi = λ, yi < λ, respectively (where λ = φ2(y)). We have
λ =
∑
i∈I+(y) yi − 1
|I+(y)| =
∑
i∈I+(y)∪I0(y) yi − 1
|I+(y)|+ |I0(y)| ,
which is piecewise linear in y since there are only finitely many index possible sets of indices and
I+(y) is always nonempty (otherwise
∑
i(yi − λ)+ = 0). To see Lipschitz continuity, let y′ be
such that ‖y′ − y‖1 ≤ , where 0 <  < min{|yi − yj | : i, j ∈ [n], yi 6= yj}. It must hold that
I+(y) ⊆ I+(y′). In other words, λ′ = φ2(y′) does not deactivate any i ∈ I+(y), only bringing new
i ∈ I0(y). Hence, it holds that |λ′ − λ| ≤ ‖y−y′‖1|I+(y)| ≤ ‖y − y′‖1. In other words, φ2 is 1-Lipschitz
continuous w.r.t. ‖ · ‖1.
Finally, [65, Algorithm 1]) computes λ and y∗ in O(n log n) time. 
Slightly abusing the notation, let φ2 also denote the mapping from x ∈ Rn×m to λ ∈ Rm, that is,
λj = ϕ2(x1j , . . . , xnj). Let
φ(x) = φ2(φ1(x))/γ
and pt = φ(xt). Here, φ1 is 2-Lipschitz continuous and φ2 is 1-Lipschitz continuous w.r.t. ‖ · ‖1.
For any optimal solution x∗ ∈ X ∗, by x∗ = ΠX (x∗) and KKT conditions for (1) and (20), it can be
seen that
p∗ = φ(x∗).
Using the Lipschitz continuity properties of φ1, φ2 and Theorem 2 (properties ), we have
‖pt − p∗‖1 = ‖φ(xt)− φ(ΠX∗(xt))‖1 ≤ 1
γ
‖φ1(xt)− φ1(ΠX∗(xt))‖1
≤ n
γ
‖φ1(xt)− φ1(ΠX∗(xt))‖ ≤ 2n
γ
· ‖xt −ΠX∗(xt)‖
≤ 2n
γ
·
√
2HX (A)
µ
(f(xt)− f∗)
≤ 2n
γ
√
2HX (A)
µ
·
(
1− µ
2HL‖A‖2
)t/2
·
√
f(x0)− f∗.
Therefore, we can take C = 2nγ
√
2HX (A)
µ ·
√
f(x0)− f∗ and ρ =
√
1− µ2HL‖A‖2 ∈ (0, 1).
Since p∗ ≥
¯
p > 0, we can bound the maximum relative price error ηt = maxj
|ptj−p∗j |
p∗j
as follows,
where
¯
pmin = minj
¯
pj .
ηt ≤ ‖p
t − p∗‖1
¯
pmin
≤ C
¯
pmin
· ρt.
C QL utilities
C.1 Derivation of the QL-Shmyrev convex program (4)
In [21, Lemma 5], the convex program for the equilibrium prices is as follows:
min
∑
j
pj −
∑
i
Bi log βi s.t. vijβi ≤ pj , ∀ i, j, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. (22)
Note that it is simply the dual of EG under linear utilities (20) with additional constraints β ≤ 1.
Assuming v is nondegenerate, by a change of variable and Lagrange duality, we can derive the dual
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of (22). First, at optimality, it must holds that βi > 0 for all i. Therefore, by nondegeneracy of v,
pj > 0 for all j at optimality. Let pj = eqj and βi = e−γi . The above problem is equivalent to
min
∑
j
eqj +
∑
i
Biγi
s.t. qj + γi ≥ log vij , ∀ i, j,
γ ≥ 0.
(23)
Let bij ≥ 0 be the dual variable associated with constraint qj + γi ≥ log vij . The Lagrangian is
L(q, γ, b) :=
∑
j
eqj +
∑
i
Biγi −
∑
i,j
bij (qj + γi − log vij)
=
∑
j
(
eqj −
(∑
i
bij
)
qj
)
+
∑
i
(Bi −
∑
j
bij)γi +
∑
i,j
(log vij)bij .
Clearly, when
∑
j bij ≤ Bi for all i, γ ≥ 0, L(q, γ, b) is minimized at qj = log
∑
i bij and γ = 0.
When
∑
j bij > Bi for some i, L → −∞ as γi → ∞. Therefore, when
∑
j bij ≤ Bi for all i, we
have
g(b) =
∑
j
∑
i,j
bij −
(∑
i
bij
)
log
∑
i
bij
+∑
i,j
(log vij)bij .
Therefore, the dual is
max g(b) s.t. b ≥ 0,
∑
j
bij ≤ Bi, ∀ i.
Adding slack variables δ = (δ1 . . . , δn) and writing it in minimization form yield (4).
Remark When some vij = 0 (but v is still nondegenerate), by the above derivation, the first
summation in (4) should be replaced by
∑
(i,j)∈E , where E = {(i, j) : vij > 0}. The dual remains
the same otherwise.
C.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Similar to the proof of Lemma 11, this can be seen via the uniqueness of the optimal solution (p∗, β∗)
of (22), that is, from uniqueness of β∗ to that of p∗j = maxi vijβ
∗
i .
Let (b∗, δ∗) be an optimal solution to (4). Note that strong duality holds for (23) and (4), since there
exit simple strictly feasible solutions. By the derivation in Appendix C.1, it holds that q∗j = log
∑
i b
∗
ij
gives an optimal solution to (23) (the first-order optimality condition). Therefore,
p∗j = e
q∗j =
∑
i
b∗ij .
Next we establish the upper and lower bounds on p∗. By the derivation in Appendix C.1 and Lagrange
duality, for any optimal solution b∗ to (4), it holds that p∗j :=
∑
i b
∗
ij and β
∗
j = minj∈Ji
p∗j
vij
give the
(unique) optimal solution to (22). Clearly, β∗ ≤ 1 and therefore
p∗j = max
i
vijβ
∗
i ≤ max
i
vij = p¯j .
By [21, Lemma 5], the dual of (22) is (c.f. the original EG primal 1)
max
u, x, s
∑
i
Bi log ui − si
s.t. ui ≤ v>i xi + si, ∀ i,∑
i
xij ≤ 1, ∀ j,
x, s ≥ 0.
(24)
Clearly, strong duality holds for (22) and (24). Furthermore, notice the following.
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• β∗i = Biu∗i at optimality, where u
∗
i is the amount of utility of buyer i. This is by the stationarity
condition in the KKT optimality conditions.
• u∗i ≤ ‖vi‖1 +Bi, where the right hand side is the amount of utility of all items and the entire
budget. This can also be seen as follows. When si > Bi, decreasing si strictly increases the
objective of (24). Therefore, the optimal s∗ must satisfy s∗i ≤ Bi. It then follows from the
constraint ui ≤ v>i xi + si.
Therefore,
p∗j ≥ max
i
vijβ
∗
i ≥ max
i
vijBi
‖vi‖1 +Bi = ¯
pj .
C.3 Proof of Theorem 7
Similar to [8, Lemma 7], we first establish the following “generalized Lipschitz condition” for ϕ,
which is key to the claimed last-iterate convergence.
Lemma 14 For all (b, δ), (b′, δ′) ∈ B, it holds that
ϕ(b′) ≤ ϕ(b) + 〈∇ϕ(b), b′ − b〉+D(b′, δ′‖b, δ). (25)
Proof. Recall that pj(b) =
∑
i bij ,
∂
∂bij
ϕ(b) = log
pj(b)
vij
. For (a, δa), (b, δb) ∈ B, we have
ϕ(b)− ϕ(a)− 〈∇ϕ(a), b− a〉
= −
∑
i,j
(1 + log vij)(bij − aij) +
∑
j
pj(b) log pj(b)−
∑
j
pj(a) log pj(a)
−
∑
i,j
(bij − aij) log pj(a)
vij
= −
∑
i,j
(bij − aij) +
∑
j
pj(b) log
pj(b)
pj(a)
=
∑
i
(δbi − δai ) +
∑
j
pj(b) log
pj(b)
pj(a)
. (26)
Note that convexity and smoothness of x 7→ x log xy (y > 0) implies
δbi − δai ≤ δbi log
δbi
δai
. (27)
Meanwhile, as in the proof of [8, Lemma 7], by convexity of q(x, y) = x log xy , it holds that∑
j
pj(b) log
pj(b)
pj(a)
≤
∑
i,j
bij log
bij
aij
. (28)
By (27) and (28), the right hand side of (26) can be bounded by D(b, δb‖a, δa). Therefore, (25) holds.

Next, we prove the inequality on the right. Clearly, (b0, δ0) ∈ B. By [8, Theorem 3] (with objective
f = ϕ, constraint set C = B and stepsize γ), we have
ϕ(bt)− ϕ(b∗) ≤ D(b
∗, δ∗‖b0, δ0)
t
.
Similar to the proof of [8, Lemma 13], we can bound the Bregman divergence on the right hand side
as follows, where bij = δi = Bim+1 .
D(b∗, δ∗‖b0, δ0) =
∑
i,j
b∗ij log
b∗ij
Bi
+
∑
i
δ∗i log
δ∗i
Bi
+
∑
i,j
b∗ij log(m+ 1) +
∑
i
δ∗i log(m+ 1)
≤
∑
i,j
b∗ij log(m+ 1) +
∑
i
δ∗i log(m+ 1)
≤ ‖B‖1 log(m+ 1),
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where the first inequality is because
b∗ij
Bi
≤ 1. Combining the above yields the desired inequality.1
Finally, we show the inequality on the left. By optimality of (b∗, δ∗), we have
〈∇ϕ(b∗), b− b∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀ (b, δ) ∈ B.
Recall that pj(b) =
∑
i bij . By (26), we have
D(pt‖p∗) = −
∑
i,j
(btij − b∗ij) +
∑
j
pj(b
t) log
pj(b
t)
pj(b∗)
≤ ϕ(bt)− ϕ∗.

C.4 Details from MD (5) to PR (6)
Note that (5) is buyer-wise separable: for each i, we have (where ∂∂bij ϕb(b) = log
pj(b)
vij
and
Bi = Bi ·∆m+1)
(bt+1i , δ
t+1
i ) = arg min
(bi,δi)∈Bi
∑
j
(
log
pj(b
t)
vij
− log btij
)
bij − (log δti)δi +
∑
j
bij log bij + δi log δi
= arg min
(bi,δi)∈Bi
−
∑
j
(log btij)bij − (log δti)δi +
∑
j
bij log bij + δi log δi. (29)
By Lemma 6, for all i, j,
bt+1ij = Bi ·
vijb
t
ij
pj(bt)∑
`
vi`bti`
p`(bt)
+ δti
, δt+1j = Bi ·
δti∑
`
vi`bti`
p`(bt)
+ δti
. (30)
Let ptj = pj(b
t). Then, (30) can be written in terms of the allocations xtij = b
t
ij/p
t
j (which sum up to
1 over buyers i for any item j) and leftover δti , thus giving (6).
C.5 Convergence of prices
Let ηt = maxj
|ptj−p∗j |
p∗j
be the relative price error, which can clearly be bounded by ‖p
t−p∗‖1
¯
pmin
, where
¯
pmin = minj
¯
pj > 0 is given in Lemma 2. By Theorem 7 and strong convexity of KL divergence
(w.r.t. ‖ · ‖1), for bt and pt = p(bt) generated by either PG or PR,
1
2
‖pt − p∗‖21 ≤ D(pt‖p∗) ≤ ϕ(bt)− ϕ∗. (31)
Therefore, for PG, the quantities ηt, ‖pt − p∗‖ and D(pt‖p∗) all converge linearly to 0. For PR, they
converge at O(1/T ).
We can further bound ϕ(bt)− ϕ∗ by the duality gap. Specifically, given bt, pt = p(bt), let
bti = min
{
min
j
ptj
vij
, 1
}
.
Then, (pt, βt) is feasible to (22). By weak duality,
ϕ(bt)− ϕ∗ ≤ ϕ(bt) + g(pt, βt), (32)
where g(p, β) is the (minimization) objective of (22). Combining the above, we have
ηt ≤
√
2 (ϕ(bt) + g(pt, βt))
¯
pmin
.
Note that the above holds for bt from either PG or PR. Although neat in theory, numerical experiments
suggest that the above bound can be loose and is not suitable as a termination criteria.
1In fact, the bound log(mn) in [8, Lemma 13] (which assumes ‖B‖1 = 1) can be easily strengthened to
logm via the above derivation. In other words, it does not depend explicitly on the number of buyers (but
implicitly through ‖B‖1 in general).
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D Leontief utilities
D.1 Derivation of (7)
The primal EG (1) under Leontief utilities ui(xi) = minj∈Ji
xij
aij
can be written in both x and u:
min
u, x
−
∑
i
Bi log ui
s.t. ui ≤ xij
aij
, ∀j ∈ Ji, ∀i ∈ [n],∑
i
xij ≤ 1, ∀ j ∈ [m],
x ≥ 0, u ≥ 0.
Clearly, it can also be written in terms of ui only as follows:
min −
∑
i
Bi log ui s.t.
∑
i∈Ij
aijui ≤ 1, ∀ j, u ≥ 0. (33)
Let pj ≥ 0 be the dual variable associated with constraint
∑
i∈Ij aijui ≤ 1. The Lagrangian is
L(u, p) = −
∑
i
Bi log ui +
∑
j
pj
∑
i∈Ij
aijui − 1

= −
∑
j
pj +
∑
i
[−Bi log ui + 〈ai, p〉ui] .
Note that minimizing L w.r.t. u can be performed separably for each ui. For any i such that∑
j∈Ji pj > 0, by first-order stationarity condition, the term −Bi log ui + 〈ai, p〉ui is minimized
at u∗i (p) =
Bi
〈ai,p〉 with minimum value Bi(1− logBi) + Bi log〈ai, p〉. If
∑
j∈Ji pj = 0, the term
approaches −∞ as ui →∞. Therefore, the dual objective is
g(p) =
{
−∑j pj +∑iBi log〈ai, p〉+∑iBi(1− logBi) if p ≥ 0 and ∑j∈Ji aijpj > 0
−∞ o.w.
Hence the (Lagrangian) dual problem is maxp g(p). Its minimization form, up to the constant
−∑iBi(1− logBi), is
min
∑
j
pj −
∑
i
Bi log〈ai, p〉
 s.t. p ≥ 0. (34)
By Theorem 1, we have the following.
• An optimal solution to (34) gives equilibrium prices.
• A market equilibrium (x∗, p∗) satisfies 〈p∗, xi〉 = Bi for all i and
∑
i x
∗
ij = 1 for all j.
Therefore, we have
∑
j p
∗
j = ‖B‖1.
Therefore, we can add the constraint
∑
j pj = ‖B‖1 to (34) without affecting any optimal (equilib-
rium) solution. This leads to (7).
D.2 Proof of Lemma 3
let p be any feasible solution to (7). Since
∑
j pj = ‖B‖1, we have 〈ai, p〉 ≤ ‖ai‖∞‖p‖1 =
‖ai‖∞‖B‖1 for all i. Meanwhile, by Appendix D.1, at equilibrium, p∗ and primal variables u∗i satisfy
u∗i =
Bi
〈ai,p∗〉 (by stationarity) and u
∗
i ≤ utility of getting one unit of every item = minj∈Ji 1aij =
1
‖ai‖∞ for all i. Therefore 〈ai, p∗〉 = Biu∗i ≤ ‖ai‖∞‖B‖1.
25
D.3 Linear convergence of utilities
Note that the equilibrium utilities u∗ are clearly unique by (33). By the KKT stationary condition,
u∗i =
Bi
〈ai, p∗〉 , ∀ i
for equilibrium prices p∗. Therefore, an intuitive construction of ut is as follows. Let pt be the current
iterate, rti = 〈ai, p〉. First compute u˜ti = Birti . Then, to satisfy the primal constraints
∑
i uiaij ≤ 1,
take
ut =
u˜t
maxj
∑
i uiaij
=
u˜t
‖a>u˜‖∞ .
Let r∗ = 〈ai, p∗〉 = Biu∗i and f
∗ = arg minp∈P h˜(ap) = h˜(r
∗) = h(r∗). Strong convexity of h˜
implies µ2 ‖rt−r∗‖2 ≤ h(rt)−f∗. Furthermore, the mapping rt 7→ u˜t 7→ ut is Lipschitz continuous
on rt ∈ [
¯
r, r¯]. Therefore, ‖ut − u∗‖ converges to 0 linearly as well.
E Additional details on numerical experiments
For linear utilities, we generate market data v = (vij) where vij are i.i.d. from standard Gaussian,
uniform, exponential, or lognormal distribution. For each of the sizes n = 50, 100, 150, 200 (on
the horizontal axis) and m = 2n, we generate 30 instances with unit budgets Bi = 1 and random
budgets Bi = 0.5 + B˜i (where B˜i follows the same distribution as vij). See §6 for plots under
random budgets and below for those under uniform budgets.
The termination conditions (on the vertical axis) are
(pt, p∗) ≤ η, η = 10−2, 10−3,
where p∗ is the optimal Lagrange multipliers of (1) computed by CVXPY+Mosek. Then, for
n = 100, 200, 300, 400 and n = 2m, we repeat the above with termination conditions
dgapt/n ≤ η, η = 10−3, 10−4, 10−5, 5× 10−6.
For QL utilities, we repeat the above (same random v, same sizes and termination conditions) using
budgets Bi = 5(1 + B˜i). This is to make buyers have nonzero bids and leftovers (i.e., 0 < δ∗i < Bi)
at equilibrium in most scenarios. In this case, p∗ = p(b∗), where b∗ is the optimal solution to (4)
computed by CVXPY+Mosek. For QL, FW does not perform well in initial trials and is excluded in
subsequent experiments.
For the linesearch subroutine LSα,β,Γ in PG (see Appendix A.5), we use parameters α = 1.02,
β = 0.8 and Γ = 100L‖A‖2 throughout.
For Leontief utilities, in addition to dgapt/n ≤ η, we also use the termination condition (ut, u∗) =
maxj
|utj−u∗j |
u∗j
≤ η, where u∗ is the optimal solution to EG under Leontief utilities (33) computed by
CVXPY+Mosek.
Computing the duality gap For linear utilities, the objective of the original Shmyrev’s convex
program (19) is
ϕ(b) = −
∑
i,j
(log vij)bij +
∑
j
pj(b) log pj(b)
where pj(b) =
∑
i bij . Recall the objective of the (EG) dual (20), equivalent to the dual of Shmyrev’s
(19),
g(p, β) =
∑
j
pj −
∑
i
Bi log βi.
Given iterate bt, let ptj = pj(b
t) and βti = minj
pj
vij
, which is finite since v is nondegenerate and
pt > 0. The duality gap is computed via
dgapt = ϕ(b
t) + g(pt, βt).
For QL utilities, it is computed similarly, that is, through (32). For Leontief utilities, it is computed
using the construction in Appendix D.3.
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Additional plots In §6, the plots for linear utilities are generated under random Bi. Here we
present an augmented set of plots under different utilities, unit and random budgets Bi and different
termination conditions (dgapt/n ≤ η or (pt, p∗) ≤ η). The legends are in the subplot [Linear
utilities, dgap/n ≤1e-3].
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